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Strengthening the role of the European Parliament has often been proposed as a method for
addressing the EU’s alleged democratic deﬁcit. Sergio Fabbrini writes that while there are
legitimate criticisms to be made about the intergovernmental model of European integration, any
attempt to create a system approximating national parliamentary democracy at the European level
would be counter-productive. He argues that what the integration project requires is a new theory
that moves beyond the standoﬀ between intergovernmental and parliamentary approaches.
It seems that the only viable alternative to the current ‘ intergovernmentalisation’ of the European
Union (EU) continues to be the latter’s ‘parliamentarisation’: that is, the gradual evolution of the EU towards a
system of government resembling parliamentary democracy in a nation state. However, would the EU actually
beneﬁt from further parliamentarisation? Would the system produced by such a move really be more democratic?
Far from being a positive development, I would argue that the ‘parliamentarist’ model of European integration
constitutes little more than the tyranny of the familiar. The scholars and politicians who support it base their opinion
on the assumption that the EU is not fundamentally diﬀerent from a nation state. The argument is largely that what
has worked in London or Berlin should also work in Brussels. Yet this perspective is both politically unrealistic and
analytically wrong, for it fails to acknowledge the key diﬀerence between a nation state and a union of states.
This is the diﬀerence between a federal state (emerging from the disaggregation of a previously unitary state) and a
federal union (created by the aggregation of previously independent states). Empirically speaking, federal states like
Germany, Austria, Belgium, Canada and Australia have all adopted a parliamentary system of government, but none
of the federations by aggregation (or federal unions, such as the United States and Switzerland) have done so.
Federal unions have adopted, at the horizontal level, a speciﬁc brand of separation of power, given their need to
prevent the formation of a strong and centralised decision-making centre – a need genetically less relevant in
federal states.
Although parliamentarisation has not been the only road to democratisation in federal political systems, in the case
of the EU a particular mantra has come to be repeated, namely that the European Parliament should become like
national parliaments in order to make the Union democratic. As national parliaments elect national governments, the
European Parliament should thus elect the Commission and its President. Indeed, the election of Jean-Claude
Juncker as Commission President was hailed by parliamentarists as the closest approximation to that view, given
his status as the so called spitzenkandidat of the European People’s Party (EPP), which received a plurality of seats
in the 2014 European Parliament elections.
Juncker’s candidature was imposed on the European Council. Addressing the European Parliament in his speech
on 15 July 2014, Juncker noted that “for the ﬁrst time, a direct link has thereby been established between the
outcome of the European Parliament elections and the proposal of the President of the European Commission…
(This link) has the potential to insert a very necessary additional dose of democratic legitimacy into the European
decision-making process, in line with the rules and practices of parliamentary democracy” (italics added).
Nevertheless, the Juncker Commission has not become a parliamentary executive. Its composition was decided by
the heads of state and government of the European Council, who nominated the highest number ever of previous
national Prime Ministers and Ministers as Commissioners. One might even argue that the Commission has been
‘intergovernmentalised’, rather than ‘parliamentarised’. Moreover, the deepening of the Greek crisis has shown that
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the true decision-makers have been sitting in the
Eurogroup and the Euro Summit, not at the
Berlaymont building hosting the Commission.
To make matters worse, the Parliament has been
excluded from the main decisions over euro-related
economic policy, given its role in representing all EU
citizens, rather than simply those of the Eurozone.
The present situation has even given rise to a
suggestion that the national parliaments of Eurozone
states should be involved in some direct way in
decision-making at the European level – a proposal
that could further weaken the European Parliament’s
role in economic matters.
Even when the European Parliament and the
Commission have appeared to gain inﬂuence, things
have not changed as expected. Look at the ‘Five
Presidents report’ on ‘a more genuine economic and
monetary union’, submitted to the European Council in June, with the aim of updating the ‘Four Presidents report’ of
2012. Although the document was formally drafted by Jean-Claude Juncker, with the European Parliament
President Martin Schulz ﬁnally accepted as a member of the presidential team, it turned out to be a much less
supranational-oriented document than the one written by the then President of the European Council, Herman Van
Rompuy, in 2012. Thus, in the Eurozone, the opposite of parliamentarisation is happening, regardless of the
parliamentary election of Jean-Claude Juncker.
The key factor underlying this is that the EU cannot adopt a parliamentary form of government due to structural,
rather than contingent, reasons. Regardless of the parliamentary rhetoric celebrated in the Treaties, parliamentarism
cannot give a feasible answer to the two main systemic constraints within the EU: the demographic asymmetries
between its member states and the national diﬀerentiation between the latter’s citizens. Given these systemic
constraints, it would be unacceptable to recognise only the European Parliament as the source of governmental
authority in the EU, if not as the source of the EU’s democratic legitimacy.
If this were to occur then the representatives of smaller member states (currently around three quarters of the total)
would consistently be in a minority, given the national diﬀerentiation between citizens cannot be regulated through
the same ‘left vs right’ axis that exists at the national level. It is no coincidence that federations by aggregation have
adopted a decision-making system based on separation rather than fusion of powers. Separation of powers oﬀers a
mechanism for guaranteeing multiple access points to the decision-making process: a setup that protects small
member states and prevents the formation of permanent hegemonies by larger ones.
Certainly, in systems that fuse powers, it is much easier to take decisions, as long as the government enjoys the
political conﬁdence of the majority of the legislature, and it is also much easier to identify who is responsible for what.
This is not the case in systems based on a separation of powers, where the government is a process, not an
institution. However, a union of states is not a nation state. In complex situations, simple ‘solutions’ can worsen the
problem, rather than solving it.
The EU is presently stuck between the views of intergovernmentalists (who prioritise the decision-making role of
national governments) and parliamentarists (who stress that the European Parliament is the only institution capable
of representing European citizens). A union of states and citizens should indeed represent the interests of both in its
decision-making system, through an institutional architecture based on a separation of powers and checks and
balances. Between the intergovernmental union and the parliamentary union, there is an ocean to sail. Because of a
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lack of comparative knowledge and an abundance of intellectual indolence, the partisans of parliamentarism have
become prisoners of their own rhetoric. A rhetoric that is not suﬃcient for unmasking the fallacy of
intergovernmentalism. Without a new political theory, it will be impossible to ﬁnd an original solution to the dual
nature of the EU.
For more information on this topic see the author’s recent book, Which European Union? Europe After the Euro
Crisis, and article in the Journal of European Integration.
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